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INTERVIEW
THE FEDERAL COURTS: OBSERVATIONS FROM THIRTY
YEARS ON THE BENCH
The Honorable Robert R. Merhige, Jr.*
J. Christopher Lemons:** Judge Merhige, you finished your
thirtieth year on the bench in August. In your thirty years, you
have presided over a variety of cases. During your tenure, what
changes have you observed in the structure, administration, and
function of the federal courts, and have these changes had a
positive or a negative effect on the federal judiciary?
Judge Merhige: Well, I'm not sure that I'm conscious of any
real change in the system. When I practiced law in the federal
courts, we tried more federal criminal cases, such as conspiracy
to run a liquor business or running stills and that sort of thing.
The federal courts changed, in my view, with the civil rights
movement. rm grateful that I was here when the individual
rights of people came to the forefront. The federal courts have
always been here, but I think the individual rights of people
were pretty well neglected. I came on in 1967, and one of the
first civil rights cases I had involved the University of Virgin-
ia.1 Very few people know about it or concerned themselves
* United States Senior District Judge, United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Vnginia Judge Merhige was appointed to the Eastern District of
Virginia in 1967.
** J. Christopher Lemons is a second year law student at the University of
Richmond School of Law. He is a staff member of the University of Richmond Law
Review.
1. See Kirstein v. Rectors & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 309 F. Supp. 184 (E.D.
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with it. It concerned the admission of women to the University
of Virginia. I had never thought about it. It shocked me, but
that was the first one that I had. Then along came the school
cases.' That's been the biggest change I think in the system.
The court has been more accessible. It has always been accessi-
ble, but it's being utilized more than it ever had before in the
early 1960s. That's the change I've seen.
When you talk about the structure, I haven't seen any chang-
es except we have many more judges than we have had in the
past. When I came on board in 1967, there were less than 500
federal judges, including the Supreme Court of the United
States. We have many more judges than that now, which sim-
ply means that more people are asserting their rights. The
federal system is a system set up, insofar as individuals are
concerned, for minorities. That doesn't mean gender necessarily
or race or religion. I say it's for minorities because the majority
has the legislature, and the legislature is bound by the majori-
ty. The majority can change the law. When I say minorities, I
mean people whose views are different from that of the majori-
ty. And not just views, but if the rights of the minority conflict
with the majority's view, the minority has to have some place
to go. They began to come into the federal courts after the Dred
Scott3 decision and after passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. That's been the biggest change, and I've seen it grow
over the last thirty years. I've seen other aspects of change.
I've seen people coming into the federal courts in diversity ac-
tions, for example. At one time, it was necessary to do it be-
cause there was the old boys' syndrome. There was a fellow
from Connecticut who didn't think he was going to get a fair
shake in Mississippi or even Virginia and that sort of thing. I
don't know whether that was true or not. I know it's not true
today. I know that state judges are just as sophisticated and as
well-educated and as interested in the Constitution of the Unit-
ed States as any federal judges. I don't think that was true
before. You know, it wasn't as strongly felt as it is now and
Va. 1970).
2. See Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972); Bradley
v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 325 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Va. 1971); Bradley v. Richomond Sch.
Bd., 317 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Va. 1970).
3. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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has been over the last thirty years, but that change I've seen.
Lemons: Have you seen any change in the actual day-to-day
practice in the federal courts?
Judge Merhige: Well, yes, dramatically in the criminal section.
We have many, many more criminal cases now than we had
thirty years ago. I can tell you the favorite drug around thirty
years ago was heroin. I practiced law for twenty-two years, and
I had what was generally considered a heavy criminal docket,
not because of me, but because of the reputation of my senior
partner, Mr. Bremner.4 In twenty-two years, I handled two
drug cases... two. The average lawyer today that does any
criminal practice handles two a week. There's been that change,
and that has been a change, I guess, in society. I have seen the
popular drugs go from heroin and marijuana to cocaine and
then crack. I get the feeling now it's kind of slipping back to
heroin because heroin is becoming more popular now. It was
sort of out of the phase for a little while. The criminal docket
has changed.
Lemons: In 1993, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were
amended. Some commentators believed the new amendments
were going to substantially impact the practice of law in federal
courts.5 Have those amendments produced the substantial
changes that were expected?
Judge Merhige: To be perfectly frank, I think they've been very
effective. Thirty years ago, there wasn't as much discovery done
as there is now, at least formal discovery. There was a method,
of course. The rules are contemplated to avoid ambush. When
you know everything that's going to happen, it sort of takes the
fun out of trying a case somtimes. But I find that the discovery
aspect of the rules is more utilized than anything else. I think
that's good.
4. Prior to his appointment to the bench, Judge Merhige practiced law with
Leith S. Bremner in Richmond, Virginia.
5. See generally Terry Griffin, Comment, A Critical Analysis of the Formulations
and Content of the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 63 U.
CIN. L. REV. 869 (1995) (stating that the goals of the amendments were to reduce the
cost of litigation, minimize delays and decrease the adversarial nature of litigation).
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Lemons: The Eastern District opted out of most of the 1993
amendments to the discovery rules,' particularly the mandatory
initial disclosure guidelines of Rule 26(a)(1).' What factors led
the Eastern District to opt out?
Judge Merhige: We thought that it was an unnecessary thing.
It wasn't needed. We burden the Bar terribly, I think. I think
we have too many rules, but ultimately the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure have been helpful to get to the goal that we're
after, which is to serve the interests of justice, what is right.
The rules help, but they put an awful burden on the parties. If
you add on more rules than the basic ones, it's just a burden
on the people, the client. It costs money to do these things. It's
why we got into this terrible, I think horrible, "billable hour
syndrome." Lawyers felt an obligation to get as many billable
hours they could do, much of it unnecessary, and we just
proved it was unnecessary. It's just as simple as that. And we
have a lot of federal and local rules, which I'm embarrassed to
say, I'm not as well versed with as I should be. I may be the
wrong guy to be talking with about these things because Im
main-stationed here. I've practiced just literally all over the
country, and the Bar is different depending on where you are.
The Richmond, Virginia Bar, I think, is the best Bar in the
whole country. The lawyers are dedicated to doing the right
thing.
Lemons: The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1993 Amend-
ments to Rule 11 indicate that the purpose of the amended rule
is "to reduce the large number of motions for sanctions present-
ed under the previous rule."8 Has revised Rule 11 been success-
ful in providing practical and effective deterrence to unaccept-
able conduct?
Judge Merhige: I haven't seen any particular change, to be
perfectly honest with you. Let me describe it this way. In the
last five years, I have not "formally" heard five discovery mo-
tions or contested discovery motions a year. I say "formally"
because I have another system that may or may not be the
right one. Today, the lawyers are so cooperative. They work it
6. See E.D. VA. Loc. R. 26(AX2) (effective Feb. 1, 1997).
7. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(aX1).
8. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note.
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out. Most motions come up when somebody doesn't deliver some
discovery material, or you get into something like a lawyer very
foolishly telling a client at a deposition not to answer the ques-
tion. The ruling that the court makes generally would not con-
stitute reversible error, even if the judge were wrong. The Bar
in Richmond knows that, with me, if they get into discovery
situations such as depositions and there is a difference of opin-
ion, they don't have to come down here and set a date for a
formal hearing. They pick up the telephone. If they don't be-
lieve that the ruling is contrary to what somebody wants and
would be reversible error, they just pick up the telephone and
we have a conference call. If they think the issue is important
enough and if the judge, me, made an erroneous ruling that
would be reversible, then they simply call my secretary and
say, "Can you tell the judge we've got an issue that we'd like to
be heard on." And I get my court reporter and hear the motion.
That's the whole point. But hearing it in the court, I know I
don't have five formal hearings a year on any discovery prob-
lems. We have a cooperative Bar. That may not be true some
places. I think it's about being a Virginian, if you want to know
the truth of the matter.
Lemons: Have you experienced difficulty in other jurisdictions
where you've presided?
Judge Merhige: Well, I wouldn't say difficulty. You don't have
difficulty with me when you are the guy who calls the shots. I
will tell you that there is something about the robe that helps.
But I don't find all districts to have a Bar as conditioned to be
as cooperative as we have here in Virginia. I think that's the
best way to describe it.
Lemons: Justice Thomas joined Justice Scalia to express their
opposition to the proposed Rule 11 amendments. Justice Scalia
argued that the reversion from mandatory sanctioning under
former Rule 11 to discretionary sanctioning under amended
Rule 11 would, in Justice Scalia's words, "render the Rule
toothless."' In support of his argument, Justice Scalia asserts
that judges are not free from the human inclination against
imposing punishment when it's not actually required, especially
9. Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507
(1993) (dissenting statement of Justice Scalia).
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when the receiver of such punishment would be a colleague or
a professional acquaintance.' Do you agree with Justice
Scalia?
Judge Merhige: No. But I'm what can be described as an activ-
ist judge. I guess it's true, but I don't know. I don't feel any
different than anybody else. Because I think the first function
of the federal judge, or any judge, is to settle the case. And I
can only speak for myself; I can't even speak for all the federal
judiciary. My personal view is that the best way to get rid of a
case is to settle it. Sometimes I'm of the view it's the only way
to do it. A judgment doesn't settle a case. What it does is pre-
pare the client for two more years of worrying about the matter
because there's an automatic appeal, and sanctions harden
people.
The Bar knows me well enough. Good lawyers have a book
on all the judges. I don't encourage or even acquiesce in skirt-
ing the rules, or failing to live up to them, but I have found
that when you issue sanctions, you harden people. And Im
interested in seeing every case resolved amicably. Good lawyers
will tell you that I take the issue of motions for sanctions un-
der advisement. I admit it is held over, sort of like a threat,
which may be cowardly, but it's much more effective, and they
go away. Time has a tendency to heal everything, and I don't
want to discourage attorneys from discussing settlement. When
you start slapping sanctions on lawyers and embarrassing
them, sometimes it is destructive. Generally, the lawyer con-
trols that and you don't want to get the client unnecessarily
discouraged with his lawyer. You don't want to embarrass a
lawyer. When you have to do it, you have to do it. Not embar-
rass him, but when you have to take action, you have to take
action.
I think I'm pretty lenient on sanctions of any kind, and I've
been here over thirty years. I know that I have never imposed
a fine on a juror for not coming or being late. Admittedly, rve
threatened. I only have a recollection of having imposed a fine
on a lawyer and even that was de minimis, twenty-five dollars
or something of that nature. They'll go out of here from time to
10. See id. at 508.
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time and say, "Oh my God, he's going to put me under the
ground," or something like that, but the good lawyers know
that's just nonsense. I'm really not going to do it. I'd do it if I
have to, but rm not much on sanctions. I don't think they ac-
complish much.
So to that extent, I disagree with Justice Scalia. But you
have to remember that although Justice Scalia and I share the
same ultimate goal, I think the way we get to it may be dif-
ferent. For example, I don't think he is particularly interested
in whether or not I get the case of John v. Smith settled. I, on
the other hand, am interested, but not for any statistical part. I
don't have any cases on a contingent basis. I don't get paid
piece work.
I just think that the system works best if we can try to get
people to reason together. For instance, in cases regarding
corporate and business law, who is better suited to decide a
business controversy than business people? Not a fellow like
me. No, it's a matter of economics, and if I knew anything
about economics, I would never have accepted this appointment.
That's not true. I would have accepted for any reason as it
turns out. That's not the way I felt at the time though. I was
not sure it was the right thing for me to do, but it turned out
to be an exciting, wonderful and inspiring experience.
Lemons: The Eastern District operates under the "rocket
docket."
Judge Merhige: Well that is a newspaper reporter's character-
ization of us. That's the truth. Somebody wrote a story and
called it the "rocket docket."" I'm glad to talk about it because
people don't comprehend it. Some people, even lawyers, don't
understand, but the Bar here does. You want to know how I do
it? I can only speak for myself. I'm not even sure of the way
my colleagues do it, but I think generally they do almost the
same thing I do. If a party files a suit here today, and it is
served on the opposing party ten days from now, the deputy
clerk of the court, Rob Walker, sends out a notice to both par-
ties to appear before the judge within ten days. If it is fied
11. See Paul M. Barrett, 'Rocket Docket".• Federal Courts in Virginia Dispense
Speedy Justice, WALL ST. J., Dec 3. 1987, at 33.
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and no answer or pleading is filed within twenty days, the
notice goes out to the guy who filed it and to the defendant,
whoever it is. And if he doesn't have a lawyer, that's too bad.
You send it to him to appear before the judge and try to have
him appear within seven days after the elapsed time.
The goal is to have the case set for trial within thirty days of
the filing. Now that's not always possible because if the parties
don't get service, then we have to wait twenty days before we
can do anything. That waiting period is a right. We call it a
pretrial conference which is a misnomer. It's really a docket
call. I give Rob dates, I try to give them a minimum of three a
month like January 15th at 8:30, 8:45, and 9:30. We try to do
it all early for two reasons. First, we do not want to interfere
with state court dockets. State courts are rarely opened before
9:00 a.m. Second, we want to accommodate the lawyer's sched-
ule. A lawyer can only be one place at a time. So, we do it in
segments of maybe forty-five minutes, and maybe I'll only have
seven cases.
It's ridiculous sometimes because the lawyers come in here
and sit exactly where you're sitting, and we chat for a minute.
There's about a three to five minute span between each of
them. I'll have the original docket sheet which shows me the
nature of the case, like civil rights and anti-trust or something,
but that's all it shows. I'll ask what the case is about, and I'll
take maybe a minute and a half to hear it. Next, I ask whether
the attorneys have discussed settlement, and whether they have
thought about a pretrial order that they're going to get before
they leave. The pretrial order insists that they meet within so
many days in an attempt to stipulate whatever facts they can
stipulate so they don't waste their time with discovery. I also
give them a trial date.
Now the way it has gotten misinterpreted is, the original
order that tells the parties to come into the court says some-
thing to the effect that the parties should be prepared to try
the case within ninety days or something. That's fine. I'm not
going to hurry anybody, but the truth of the matter is we go
through a regular ritual. I'll ask the plaintiff when they want
to try the case, which really means, "How much time do you
need to get ready for trial?" Sometimes when we have complex
874 [Vol. 32:867
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cases, they say, "Judge it's going to take us eight to ten months
for discovery."
How about the defendant? I also get his view. If I'm satisfied,
I try to find a date that is agreeable. I don't think it happens
once a year where I'll say, "This is the date whether you like it
or not." Even when I take that course of action, the conference
may be on a Saturday so it doesn't interfere.
You'd be shocked how many cases get settled if you set them
for trial. My rule is if you need more than six months and you
satisfy me that you do, around here when the lawyer tells you
something you generally accept it. The old expression, "fool me
once good for you; fool me twice good for me," it doesn't happen
very often. If it's more than six months, the lawyers must re-
port to me once a month and tell me what they've done toward
discovery. The threat is that if nothing has been done by the
time the attorney gives me his first report, the case is going to
be moved back. Instead of waiting until next March, we're go-
ing to move it back until October. That's not much of a threat
because the Bar doesn't wait. Where they misinterpret the rule
is when they think the "rocket docket" means that we say,
"Your case is going to be tried in 90 days whether you like it or
not." We don't do that, and we wouldn't do that.
Now, you're not interested in this, but I have what I call my
"Hague days." It's my way of moving the docket along. It's my
rule, and just my rule. It's not in the Rules of Civil Procedure.
It comes from a very interesting story from the firm that is
now Hunton and Williams. Mr. Gay was a well-known, well-re-
spected lawyer who was the head man in that firm. He'd tell
the story of a lawyer, a young lawyer from that firm who went
down to the country to get a case set for trial. I think they still
do it everywhere including Richmond. He called it docket day
which is the same as what I do, called pretrial conferences, in
which the lawyers get down before the judge and the judge had
the case called and said, "All right, Mr. Jones, does this date
suit you and Mr. Smith?" They go back and forth, the same
way I do until they reach a date.
As the story goes, when the judge would suggest a day, this
young lawyer would come back and say, "Well I'm sorry, but
Mr. Gay has to be in St. Louis on that date or Mr. Gay has to
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be in New York on that day." That went on and on. The coun-
try lawyer had a country practice, and those dates were all
agreeable to him. They finally got a date that was agreeable to
the young city lawyer who said, "Mr. Gay can be here on that
date," and the Judge asked the other fellow, "Is that date all
right with you?" The response was, "I'm sorry Your Honor, I'm
scheduled to be in Hague on that day."
Now my Bar knows that, and when I have a problem getting
them together on a certain day because they say, Tm sorry
Judge, but I've got another case," we won't interfere with any
other docket. We have no authority to do that, and we wouldn't
do it anyway. Our rule, at least mine, and I think the rule of
the other judges too, is that whichever case is set first has
priority. That includes the general district court, traffic court,
or whatever it is. We should not be so bold as to interfere with
any court's docket.
But sometimes you get lawyers who say, "Oh Judge, I've got
a case in Manassas" or "I've got one in Texas." Sometimes you
just have the feeling that they're really not that busy. I say,
"Let me give you one of my Hague dates," and the Hague date
is a Saturday. The lawyers can't say they're in court somewhere
else. You'd be surprised how infrequently you have to try a case
on Saturday. The lawyers usually state, "Wait a minute Judge,
I can move this or I can move that."
It doesn't happen often, but that's the "rocket docket." The
whole theory, at least mine is, that the best way to get a case
settled is to set it for trial. The earlier you set it, the earlier
the parties are going to get together and try to settle it.
Lemons: Docket management is a problem with many courts,
and the Eastern District has, as you just described, a mecha-
nism for managing the docket and for moving cases along.
Judge Merhige: But we all have the same philosophy that the
best way to dispose of the docket is to set it for trial. Judges
sit around like everybody else, and if nobody's bothering you
about something, you might put it on the side of the desk.
Lawyers do the same thing. The squeaky wheel gets the oil. I
guess that's the expression.
Lemons: Many courts have problems with their dockets, though,
because they don't treat the cases the way that you do.
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Judge Merhige: Well, let me tell you why. I was shocked to
learn this, although I'm not critical of it, it's just different. I
have all these Dalkon Shield cases. I'm the supervising judge,
and I want to get rid of all these cases. I want them either
tried or settled. The ones that are in suit now are going to be
tried because we don't negotiate. There will not be any settle-
ment. We've already made our offer and if they turn it down,
good for them, let them go to trial. That's okay. We can't close
this bankruptcy until we get rid of all the claims. There were
about 400,000 claims to start with. We're now down to about
seventy, and they're all either in court or waiting for arbitra-
tion. They made their selection, and that is what will be done.
I asked for a list of litigation cases without trial dates. Some of
them were filed in 1986. Some were filed in 1984. That's four-
teen years. We wouldn't be so bold as to say to another judge,
"You don't do that." We'll ask the lawyer whose representing
the Dalkon Shield to see if he can't get the judge to set a trial
date.
We have learned that there are some courts, and maybe it's
a good system, that will not set a trial date until the plaintiff,
the guy who filed the suit, asks for it. Sometimes suits are fied
and they're just not pursued, and that was a surprise to me. I'd
never heard of that. I'm not critical of that system, but the
docket can get jammed up, I would think. My theory is that
plaintiffs can't run the court and neither can defendants. Judg-
es have the responsibility of handling the court. My system
works for me. Eighty-five percent of the cases that I set for
trial go away. If I didn't lift another finger, they go away.
Lemons: The subject of judicial vacancies has undergone recent
discussion. Presently, 82 out 846 seats on the federal judiciary
are unfilled.' Almost 10% of the federal judiciary is vacant.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his year end report, writes that the
continued vacancies are in his words, "eroding quality of justice
that has traditionally been associated with the federal judicia-
ry."13 What's your reaction to the Chief Justice's comment?
12. See Annual Report: Chief Justic's Annual Report Criticizes Senate's Slowness
in Confirming Judges, 66 U.S.L.W. 2408 (1998).
13. Id.
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Judge Merhige: It's hard to be completely objective when asked
to comment on the Chief Justice of the United States, but I
think he's exactly right. I read the papers about this. Obvious-
ly, politics are involved somewhere, at least I read that people
wait to see if there's going to be a different administration and
if there are going to be different judges and things like that. I
don't pay too much attention to that, but I have read that some
congressman said, "Oh, there are too many judges now. We
don't need them." Do you know how we get judges? Congress
allocates them, the judiciary doesn't. Congress says the Eastern
District of Virginia is to have twelve judges or eight judges, or
four, or whatever it might be. There's a recommendation by the
Judicial Conference of the United States, but Congress has the
authority.
So when I hear members of Congress saying there are too
many judges, they ought to go to their colleagues in Congress
and tell them. The judiciary does not set the number. I don't
think there's any one thing that gives us a risk of not being
able to administer justice reasonably. It's a combination of
things. One issue is the Speedy Trial Act.'4 The other is the
Sentencing Act.'5 One thing as a judge that I'm firm on is that
I can never be critical of a law that's passed. My job is to stay
by it. Sometimes my critics say, "Oh boy, the papers gave you
heck about this and that." That doesn't bother me. My critics
are right up in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
court of appeals. They're the only ones whose criticism is ma-
terial to me. Like everybody else, I love to be loved, but I'm not
going to be loved by everyone. I might be loved by half of the
litigants that come in here, the guys who win, maybe, but
that's not my ambition.
I get disturbed when the Supreme Court says I've been
wrong, which doesn't make me wrong. It also means that when
they affirm me, it doesn't make me right, but it's our system,
and I feel very strongly about the system. I don't think it adds
to the system for judges of any kind to criticize the system. The
Speedy Trial Act has slowed us down to some extent. Now that
we're getting jammed up, it becomes a real concern. We must
14. 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1994).
15. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994).
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try cases within seventy-two days of the arrest. Sometimes that
isn't easy to do, and the lawyers understand. They're delighted
to have the case longer than that. They also get their clients to
waive the Speedy Trial Act. I mean there are different kinds of
ways. A motion to suppress is made pre-trial, and the time is
tolled in that circumstance. Judges are very conscious of the
Speedy Trial Act, and nobody wants somebody charged with an
offense to walk in without a trial. I don't know what the need
was for the Speedy Trial Act. rm concerned though. When I
first came here, I was given a list of all the defendants who
were incarcerated. I got that list every week, and I could see
how long they were incarcerated. I inquired about it when I
saw that some of them had been in jail for a month, six weeks,
or longer. I would ask why they were in jail so long. Sometimes
there were valid reasons, such as psychiatric exams or the
lawyer didn't want a trial. There were lots of good things with
legitimate reasons. It was very effective. One reason for the
Speedy Trial Act, I suspect, is presumptively so somebody who
is presumable innocent doesn't sit in jail.
I was asked to go to Africa a few years ago by the Adminis-
trative Office of the United States and the State Department.
My whole task was to encourage the government of Zambia to
have an autonomous judiciary that was effective. I was shocked
that some people who were charged with crimes had been in
jail for eight years. I looked at the records of one person in jail,
and I said, "This fellow looks like he's been in jail for eight
years." The government official who was the equivalent of our
U.S. Attorney said, "Well, he has." I said, "Why don't you do
something about it?" He said that he would. And about a week
later, the case was dismissed. That was just sloppy work, and
we'd never have anything like that here, I don't believe. I don't
see the need for the Speedy Trial Act, but we have it.
Likewise, there is the Sentencing Act. Under that statute, it
takes us seventy-five days after somebody is found guilty before
we can sentence them, because it takes that long for the proba-
tion officer to do the report and then send a copy of that report
to counsel for the defendant and the government. Then they
have ten days to make objections to it. All of that may be good,
but it's time-consuming and things back up. We're rapidly
reaching a jammed-up stage here.
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I'll do a little bragging here because I'm fond of it, but take
me out of the picture; we don't have a lazy judge in the East-
ern District of Virginia. As a matter of fact, I don't know of a
lazy judge in the whole system. There may be one, but I don't
know who it is. There's not a one that doesn't work as hard or
harder than he or she did practicing law. We're getting to the
point now that I'm a little bit disturbed about my plans to
leave the bench because right here in this division we will have
two active judges and one senior judge when I leave.
Lord knows that Judge Williams, the other senior judge here,
deserves to act like a senior judge. As a senior judge, you don't
have to work full-time. You just give 25% of your time. Neither
Judge Williams nor I have done that. We've each given a full
100%. But if Judge Williams wants to slow down a little and
we don't see any replacement judge, Judge Payne and Judge
Spencer are going to be snowed under. They don't mind that,
and none of us are afraid of work, but I don't think it adds to
the administration of justice.
Sometimes justice delayed works well, but if you remember
the fable, it was the turtle that won the race. There's much
more to litigation; it's not two cold corporations all the time.
It's people, individuals. It's got to wear on them. It must be a
terrible thing when somebody is suing you or charging you with
an offense. I think we owe them the duty to dispose of the case
in a reasonable time.
Lemons: Recently, the Wall Street Journal ran a front page
article describing the potential for consolidation of the current
diet pill litigation."
Judge Merhige: That case has gone through Judge Bechtle. He's
on the multi-district panel with me, and it seemed to me that
he was assigned that the last time we met. The multi-district
panel is a court appointed by the Chief Justice. There are seven
of us on the panel, and we serve at the Chief Justice's plea-
sure. We are there for cases where some company or companies
get sued in various districts throughout the country, and they
wish to consolidate the cases for discovery. Well, every lawyer
16. See Richard B. Schmitt, Diet-Pill Litigation Finds Courts Frowning on Mass
Settlements, WALL ST. J., Jan. 8, 1998, at A2.
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wants the case in his backyard, and every litigant wants the
same. So they come to us on the multi-district panel, and they
give their argument as to convenience of the parties, justice
and so forth. We select the district where they will go for dis-
covery, and the judge who will hear it. As a practical matter,
more often than not, it stays there. More often than not, the
parties will agree, "Well, Judge, you know more about it now
since you've had all this discovery." It's very important.
Lemons: The article used the diet pill litigation to talk more
broadly about consolidation of mass tort cases. The author re-
flected upon the Amchem Products case handed down by the
Supreme Court in June 1997.17 In Amchem, the Supreme
Court approved decertification of the class.18 Are courts re-
thinking their approach in mass tort cases? What is your ap-
proach to these situations and how has it adjusted, if at all?
Judge Merhige: I have one of these cases now. Well, I can't
really speak as to whether I have gelled on the propriety of my
thinking. This one has to do with the apple juice litigation
that's just been assigned to me. The plaintiffs claim they
bought apple juice that was labeled "100% pure apple juice."
They claim that it was diluted, that something was added to it.
Now that's just an allegation. I don't know precisely, maybe a
sweetener. Nothing that can really harm you. The plaintiffs
claim they paid seventy-five cents a bottle because they thought
it was pure, and they would not have paid that had they real-
ized that it was not 100% pure. It's an economic thing. Nobody
has claimed, so far, that they were injured physically. It's a
commercial injury.
What's going through my mind is that it's harmful to the
system, I think, when people read there's been a class action,
it's been settled and the successful plaintiffs received a coupon
giving them a discount on something they might buy. And the
lawyers have collected a substantial fee. It worries me. How far
that should go? In my view, I've got to wrestle with, and I will,
with the question of certification. But I'm giving it serious
thought that I ought not to certify a class. I have done this. I
did it on the record to the lawyers. I stated on the record that
17. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
18. See id.
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it appeared at first blush (and I don't mean there was any
unethical conduct on anybody's part), but it appeared at first
blush that this may well be what I call "a lawyer's case," that
it's more for the benefit of lawyers than for the clients.
They would, perhaps with some justification disagree with
me, but I said, "I want you to know before you get too involved
in this, that this is the type of case that's going to end up with
coupons for the successful plaintiffs, and if they are successful,
you better prepare to accept coupons for your fee." Okay, I
laughed too. I didn't laugh then, but I laughed when I thought
about it later. It may turn out to be a stroke of genius. Within
a couple of weeks, I got a communication which said, in effect,
that the parties might settle. It's a real problem because we
don't want to discourage people from taking up these cases.
We're sort of like private Attorneys General. I'm going to only
hold it up until Monday, and I'll have a conference call with
the lawyers and tell them to make up their minds. Either turn
me loose to do what I think I should do as the judge, or settle
the case. I don't know what I'm going to do, whether I'm going
to certify it or not. I'm going to look at the latest Supreme
Court case again. This is a wonderful job. I have something
challenging everyday. I can't imagine being without it.
Lemons: Previously, we spoke of settlements. In 1976 you stat-
ed, "I think it's our responsibility to push settlements. A lot of
judges think it isn't. I think it is because I don't think we could
run the courts if we didn't get it and you know most cases are
going to get settled. Most cases should be settled."19
Judge Merhige: Well, I still feel that way. I don't know if we
couldn't run the courts. That may have been an exaggeration.
Today, people can have their issues determined, at least at the
trial level, generally within a year. If we didn't have settle-
ments, you can expand that time four fold, because, as I said, I
think eighty to eighty-five percent of the cases that come before
me settle before trial. I have a rule here that if you don't settle
before your jury comes in, you have to pay for the jury. That's
not much of a threat, especially if it's a big corporation. They're
not concerned about $40 a day plus mileage for thirty or forty
19. The Honorable Hubert L. Will et al., The Role of the Judge in the Settlement
Process, 75 F.R.D. 89, 217 (1976).
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people, but the threat is there and I use it. Most of the lawyers
get a case settled if they're wise. As reputable as they are
around here, they try to settle.
Sometimes you can't settle cases. Some cases just can't be
settled. That seems strange to me, but they tell me they can't
settle because of all of these other reasons. Yeah, I think it
would have an effect on the system, but I probably was not
accurate by saying that the courts couldn't run. I think we can
do anything. The courts can do anything, which is why I'm not
excited about mediation. I approve of arbitration because that
ends it.
Settlement is a very delicate thing. You don't want to inject
yourself in somebody's case. That's not right. I do it a certain
way. I expect all parties to try to dispose of it amicably. If I
can be of any assistance, let me know. I don't mind doing that.
I don't even mind pushing because I practiced law, but no judge
ever made me settle a case. I have had judges tell me I ought
to settle and I was foolish not to and so forth. Most of the time,
I made an honest effort. And most of the time, we got the issue
settled. But it wasn't because the judge pushed me. We settled
because I thought it was in the best interest of my client. It
depends on who you're dealing with. If I'm dealing with good
lawyers, as fortunately I am most of the time, I don't worry
about it because I know I'm not going to push them, and they
are not going to get any different treatment from me if they do
not settle than they would under any other circumstances.
I view it as an obligation of the court, but it's a limited obli-
gation. If somebody doesn't want you involved in a settlement, I
stay out of it. More times than not, though, the lawyers say,
"Judge, we appreciate the help." The good lawyers don't have to
keep the clock running. They have plenty of people, and plenty
of cases. We live in a litigious society. If they're not in this
case, they'll be in the next case.
On another note, that's why I find this advertising so dis-
gusting, because good lawyers don't need all this. It's within
the First Amendment, and I wrote an opinion before Bates"0
20. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (holding an attorney's advertise-
ment fell within the protection of the First Amendment).
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came down expressing that same view. Some of it has gotten
out of hand in my opinion.
Lemons: The topic of judicial independence has been debated
considerably over the last few years. There are those who argue
that some judges have overstepped their constitutional bound-
aries and, therefore, some degree of judicial reform is neces-
sary.21 There are other commentators who defend the current
state of the judiciary and oppose judicial reform.' What is ju-
dicial independence, and is judicial independence currently
under attack?
Judge Merhige: I think it may be under attack from time to
time. You know that's "the American way," so to speak. People
express themselves. Nobody has come up with what I think is a
better system. I don't think the criticism has been effective. It
certainly isn't effective in the federal system, as far as I'm
concerned, and I don't think it is in the state system either.
The drafters of Article III gave a great deal of thought to that.
That's one reason why federal judges are appointed during good
behavior and receive no diminution of their salaries. The
Founders didn't draft those provisions without some consider-
ation of their own experience.
When judges were appointed by the King of England, if the
judges didn't do what the King wanted, the King either got rid
of them or reduced their salaries so they walked away. The
Founders had that in mind, and I think those are two impor-
tant things. It depends on the individual. It never occurred to
me to be concerned about what other people thought. My crit-
ics, effective critics, are the court of appeals and the Supreme
Court of the United States. The oath I took requires me to
follow their mandates whether I agree with them or not. Now,
that's not being a robot, because we get plenty of cases here in
which they haven't spoken. That's exciting when you get those.
When your court of appeals or the Supreme Court have not
21. See The Judicial Reform Act of 1997, H.R. 1252, 105th Cong. (1997)
(sponsored by House Judiciary Committee Chairman Rep. Henry J. Hyde); ROBERT H.
BoRE, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 117 (1996); Katharine Q. Seelye, House G.O.P.
Begins Listing a Few Judges to Impeach, N.Y. TmES, March 14, 1997, at AS.
22. See Editorial, Misguided Judicial Reform, 81 JUDICATURE 4 (1997).
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spoken on the issue, you can really express yourself as to what
you believe the law to be.
We make mistakes, you know, we're human beings and hu-
man beings will make mistakes. I happen to be a judge that is
comforted to know that there's a court of appeals that looks
over my shoulder. Judge Haynesworth, who I was very fond of,
expressed to me one day that when the court of appeals revers-
es somebody, it doesn't mean they're wrong. Of course it does-
n't. I told him there was little comfort in that, because it seems
to me that the opposite must also be true. When they affirm, it
doesn't mean you're right. We have a system that works well.
You have to walk in the other guy's shoes to know what it's
like. I have never felt any pressure. I knew that I was to do
what the law was.
The only weakening of independence, depending on how peo-
ple view it, is that I'm not free to do what I think is right. I
am to do what the law is, and the law is as pronounced by my
appellate court. Now, sometimes they might tell me I misinter-
preted what they did or something of that nature, and that's
okay. That's kind of comforting to me. When a reversal comes,
and there haven't been many, I've been lucky, and I'm proud of
that. When the reversal comes, if I have any concern, it's that
the litigants have been put to the extra time, worry and ex-
pense, and rm not so stupid to think that just because the
court of appeals says it, that's it. No, its what I'm bound by,
that's all it is.
Lemons: What about the public criticism particularly by the
media and by politicians?
Judge Merhige: Well, they have an agenda, at least the politi-
cians and the media. They have an agenda. They want things
that sell newspapers.
Lemons: Doesn't that have, not necessarily a direct, but an
indirect effect on the judiciary as an institution and the public
perception of the judiciary?
Judge Merhige: It may. I'll assume, hypothetically, that it does,
but we have to decide which of our values is more important,
the First Amendment right to criticize the King or the right to
administer the law by majority. You know, we don't do it by
majority. You can't do it. You can't go out there and ask, "How
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many people think we should hang him? Raise your hand." We
don't decide cases by consensus, and a judge has to keep that
in his mind all the time. I know what this community thinks
about some things. I think I know. Sometimes my rulings are
contrary to what the majority of people think, and that's unfor-
tunate. Everybody would love to be loved. I have no hope of at-
taining that and would be a little bit concerned if it were so.
My concern is whether I have rendered a correct judgment in
the eyes of my superior courts, and that's the only concern. You
know, if that was so, the school cases' would have been abso-
lute hell for me. I don't know how many I had, forty or forty-
one. My recollection is that 90% of those were appealed, and
89% plus were affirmed. I was very satisfied. I would have been
more influenced by all the noise that reportedly was out there
had I been reversed on 90% of them, but I wasn't, so criticism
meant nothing to me. I had a lot of it. I didn't have marshals
with me for two years because I was Mr. Popularity. It's not a
popular job for any judge.
Lemons: Have the institution of mandatory minimum sentences
and the creation of sentencing guidelines from the United
States Sentencing Commission diminished judicial independence
or dampened the discretion of individual judges?
Judge Merhige: Well, there's a difference in discretion and inde-
pendence. I don't think it has taken away from independence. I
don't think we were born with rights to do anything. Our rights
stem from the Constitution of the United States. If you asked
me if I like the sentencing guidelines and the mandatory mini-
mum sentences, I'll tell you no, I don't. I follow them because
they're the law, and that's good enough for me.
You know, if I were a legislator, I'd be hard put to encourage
the passage of statutes calling for mandatory sentences. I think
they're a mistake. I don't think they help anyone. The thought
is not in a vacuum. We've had the death penalty in the system
for a long time. I never had to face it. I worried for awhile
what I would do if I had a case which required imposing the
death penalty. There are lots of reasons not to do it. There's a
23. See Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972); Bradley
v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 325 F. Supp. 828 (E.D. Va. 1971); Bradley v. Richomond Sch.
Bd., 317 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Va. 1970).
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moral aspect. I concluded that if I were faced with it and if I
couldn't do it, I swear I would ask God to make me live up to
it. If I find anything in the law that is so repugnant and
against all of my beliefs and teachings, I think I have enough
courage to get off the bench before I desecrate the law. I think
too much of it. Without the law we would be a bunch of canni-
bals.
For instance, I was in World War II. I flew on B-17's where
we dropped a lot of bombs on a lot of people, and I was a party
to it. I don't think I gave any thought to the moral aspect of it.
I wasn't even there for some of it. The main goal was to get off
that target and get out of there. So I've concluded that I can't
honestly say that I find it to be so, I find it repugnant, but to
be so repugnant that I couldn't do it. I had to measure it
against my responsibility to do it. I would hope it would never
come before me, but I'm not going to duck it.
Punishment, though, is retribution to a great extent, and the
public commands retribution. It's not my cup of tea. That does-
n't make it wrong. I don't believe, for example, incarceration
does much good except to protect you against the guy you've
incarcerated. Some of it deters others. I don't think the death
penalty deters anybody except for the guy that's killed. He'll
never do it again.
You have got to put people away sometimes, not only because
they're dangerous to society, but the public demands it. They're
the ones who pay the price. You've got to be careful about that.
You've got to weigh it. You can't do it just because they're the
taxpayers, and I think the retribution is part of it. Just for
people like me who think the death penalty is senseless, you
have to say to yourself, "Suppose it was your child, wife, broth-
er, mother who was the victim of one of these heinous crimes?"
I doubt if I could control myself, speaking from a moral aspect.
It's scary. The mandatory part of sentencing upsets me. I think
there's a big distinction between the man who steals a loaf of
bread to feed his children and the man who steals a loaf of
bread because he was just too damn lazy to work, and manda-
tory sentencing takes that away. You've got to weigh that
against the good. I see the good in drug cases where we have a
mandatory ten years to life for conspiracy to possess and dis-
tribute crack cocaine. I think that has a deterring effect. But I
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tell you, judicial independence isn't taken away with it. They've
given the discretion to the United States Attorney in sentencing
matters. That's what the law wants, and that's okay with me.
We're careful about who we get as United States Attorneys.
Lemons: After thirty years of judicial service, what are the
highlights of your career?
Judge Merhige: Oh, tomorrow's case. I mean that. I don't know
how it sounds, but I truly mean that. People ask me what the
most interesting case I've ever had is and my stock answer is
it's always tomorrow. That's the wonderful thing about it. Oh,
I've had some cases before, I can't call them highlights. I can
call ones that stick with me. I tried the Westinghouse Uranium
case.' I was excited about that case. It took us ninety-two
days to try it without a jury, and I had trouble slowing down to
get down here in the morning. I'd get up and shave and shower
and dress and rush down to court to watch the lawyers. I had
the finest group of lawyers that I have ever seen assembled at
one time. They were just absolutely terrific. It was exciting and
a thrill to watch them, you know.
I also had the shoot-out case down in North Carolina.' I
found that case to be one of the more interesting ones because
I had about fifteen plaintiffs and eighty defendants in a civil
case. That took us about six weeks. Some of them wouldn't
accept counsel. They were allegedly the Ku Klux Klan folks.
That was an interesting case. Just controlling the case, I found
to be a challenge.
There have been so many other cases, but tomorrow's case is
the one I look forward to.
Lemons: Do you have any regrets?
Judge Merhige: Well, if I had to do it over again, I would ac-
cept the position, let me put it that way. With regrets to this
extent, I don't know how fair I've been to my family, and I
regret that. They went through hell because I insisted on con-
forming myself to the law, and I can't be so cocksure that I do
24. See In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 517 F. Supp.
440 (E.D. Va. 1981).
25. See Waler v. Butkovich, 584 F. Supp. 909 (M.D.N.C. 1984).
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that every instance. I try, but I did it in the school cases, and I
was satisfied. I explained to my family, look they're fooling with
other people's children. People can't be quiet and objective when
their children are involved. So I understand all this hullabaloo
because they think I'm doing it, me, but I have a choice. I
thought it was the right thing, and that's what made it easier
for me.
When you stick to the law and you think it's the right thing,
that is what makes it easier. But they're going to appeal my
decisions, and then when I get affirmed, which I think I will
be, then I think the attitude in the papers will be, "Well, we
don't like him and we don't like the law, but he's doing what
he's sworn to do, following the law." That didn't happen. I kept
getting affirmed, and I don't think they ever printed that. I
don't know whether they did or not.
I have no regrets except my family maybe. I made some
financial sacrifices. The salary was $30,000 when I came on
board. I came from a law practice, which was paying substan-
tially more than that. It's hard to complain about the salary
that I get now because to the average person that sounds pret-
ty good, and I guess it is, but when you look at what happened
over the years, what's happened for thirty years, it's not so
good. You couldn't make up for the losses, but Id do it again.
I'm glad, to tell you the truth. I wasn't keen on leaving my law
practice even then, but I'm glad I came. I'm glad for all the hell
that was raised. It was an experience that I wouldn't want to
do again. It was like flying combat missions. I wouldn't want to
do it again for ten million dollars, but I wouldn't take a million
dollars for having done it. I feel the same way about this. I'm
glad I was here.
Lemons: What are the biggest challenges facing attorneys and
judges in the future, and what advice would you give to young
attorneys and those attorneys who aspire to judicial service?
Judge Merhige: I think the biggest challenge that every lawyer
and judge has is the challenge to keep up with the law, to
comprehend it. I don't know all the law, but I try to keep up
with it. I'm shocked at the number of people who come before
me who have not read what the Supreme Court or the court of
appeals has said. There are people who get their view of the
1998] 889
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
law from newspaper articles and argue cases from what they've
read somewhere. That, I find challenging. I think the challenge
to every judge and lawyer is to keep up with the study of the
law.
Judges have a challenge. You know we're going to get over-
whelmed pretty soon. We're going to get overwhelmed here. Il1
be part of it when I leave. I know Judge Williams exercises his
rights, and there's no reason why he shouldn't. If he doesn't
stay full time, Judge Payne and Judge Spencer are going to be
snowed under. That's going to affect the individual litigants
more than them. I hope they'll be intelligent enough not to kill
themselves on it. You can only do so much. They're doing the
best they can now, as we all are. That's a challenge that we all
have, but we just get frustrated just like anybody else. I get
frustrated on the bench sometimes. I come in here and turn the
cold water on my wrists and look in the mirror and say you're
the judge, act like a judge. You've got to subjugate your own
personal feelings and moods. I don't know if I'm successful at it
or not, that's for somebody else to judge, but I try, you know,
and that's comforting.
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